It would, however, be relevant to acknowledge that in spite of the predominantly savage primitivism that such socio-psychological elements indicate; the mannerisms with which such inclinations are acted upon have come to be greatly diversified as a result of being influenced by the collective boom in technological integration. This, moreover, is something that tends to be especially exemplified when considering it in light of such obvious, technologically influenced warfare factors nuclear weaponry, remote detonation, and extensive all-terrain defense surveillance. Take into consideration, for instance, the issues of espionage and/or counterespionage and they have advanced, developed and evolved over the course of time that has elapsed since the earliest known records of warfare between two or more groups of particular and profiled humans. While the medium of their operations have been dramatically revised as a result of the significance of the day and age, using spies to obtain secret information, as about another government or a business competitor continues to represent and essential component of passive warfare (Dickson, 2001).

Considering the history of military roles in concern to espionage & counterespionage
Before carrying on, however, it would be relevant to consider the fundamentality underlying the need for there to be effectual espionage as well as counterespionage existing within governmental infrastructures. This is something that is clarified to an extent when considering that espionage provides governments the key to their opposing counterparts’ variously respective plans and strategies. This consequently leads to a situation within which the former yields a measure of power over the latter, something that would be especially in in the case of the latter not being associated with any effective counterespionage bodies. This is something that tends to attain maximal simplicity when considering that while the dictionary entry for espionage lists it as an act or practice of spying or of using spies to obtain secret information, as about another government or a business competitor; counterespionage is termed as espionage undertaken to detect and counteract enemy espionage. And despite the fact that espionage as well as counterespionage contemporarily reflects an uncharacteristically crucial portion of the virtually all warfare, this is not something that is entirely new to the segment of warfare. Indeed, it would be noteworthy to acknowledge that espionage is known to have been employed as a war tactic as far back as the 1700s and 1800s.

Take into consideration, for instance, the fact that espionage, and inevitably, counterespionage too, was widely resorted to within the entireties of such predated wars as the American War for Independence and the Civil War in the US. It would also be relevant to consider that although such issue of national security have presently come to be influenced by an ascribing of dependence upon technological relevance, the fundaments remain the same; to obtain information from the opposition that can used either in favor of oneself or negativity to the country whence the data has been retrieved. The historical relevance of espionage and counterespionage, moreover, is something that is accentuated quite strongly when considering that even such socio-historically renowned names as Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and Washington tend to yield relativity to espionage/counterespionage activities typically adhered to within wartime.

Counterespionage in the 1700s: The US Revolution
The prime character trait that set apart these men from their lesser known contemporaries tends to be the fact that they have come to be exceptionally associated with ensuring victories that were of utmost essentiality to bringing about the existence of America as it stands today. And one of the prime reasons for the exceptionality of their successes, furthermore, was that they tended to be uncharacteristically comprehensive and appreciative towards the wartime advantageousness of effectually employed political/military information and/or intelligence. They were well aware of the positivistic uses of the element of surprise, and in addition to this, were also aware of the equally crucial need to apprehend the respective enemy wherever and whenever possible. ‘Espionage, counterespionage, diplomatic sleight-of-hand, propaganda, scouting, partisan warfare, code making, code breaking, sabotage, bribery, deception, and disinformation’ (Crews, 2004) were subsequently used with outcomes that proved to be surprisingly satisfactory. Contemplate, for instance, the collective features and characteristics of the numerous battles and skirmishes that constituted the entirety of the American Revolution, approximated to have transpired during the mid to late 1770s.

The significance of the use of espionage and counterespionage within this war is underscored when considering that it was the first war to rely so heavily on intelligence tactics on both sides. Indeed, virtually the entire length of the course that the Revolution took appears to have been fundamentally influenced by the various secret activities that each side had begun to become increasingly dependent upon. While the British generals moved on Concord in 1775 because they learnt from spies that the munitions were there; counterespionage bodies, in the form Colonial agents, informed the Americans of the British plans and consequently frustrated the British efforts (Crews, 2004). Furthermore, an even more relevant instance of the use of counterespionage in such a manner is apparent within Washington’s 1781 use of deception so as to induce the Brits into assuming that there was a Franco-American assault pending on New York. While the prevalence of the British forces stood by for the attack, however, Washington’s proved his military genius, in as much as covertly going with Marquis de Rochambeau to defeat Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown at Virginia. It turned out that the attack, or rather, the idea of the attack, was naught more than an American ploy to get the British forces so concentrated on New York that Washington and Rochambeau managed to get to Virginia unnoticed where, again as a result of the engineered misdirection of the British troops, they were met with minimal resistance (O'Toole, 1991).

Counterespionage running into and through the 1800s & into the 1900s
It would be relevant to here acknowledge that Washington displayed an uncharacteristically obsessive flair for espionage/counterespionage. In addition to being responsible for operational agents and networks in Philadelphia and New York, he is also credited with such wartime, espionage criticalities as uncovering the treachery of Benjamin Church, a Continental US Army medical chief who served as a British spy and; the effectual use of espionage to deduce the laxity of Hessian troops in Trenton, following which he falsely persuaded them of his passivity towards them and ended up victorious after crossing the Delaware River at night (Crews, 2004). In spite of the implications of this early use of espionage and counterespionage, however, neither the Union nor the Confederacy had established a full-scale espionage system or a military intelligence network even by the time of the Civil War, nearly a century later.

This, however, was clearly not a status report reflected by the South, where there was already an operationally embryonic spy ring radiating out of Washington, D.C.; this ring had been established towards the beginning of the 1860s and had been initiated by Thomas Jordan, a U.S. Army officer turned Confederate colonel. Like Washington, Jordan’s experiences had led him to become absolutely comprehensive and deeply appreciative in regard to ‘the benefits of placing intelligence agents in the North's military and political nerve center’ (Faust & Longacre, 2004). It is apparent, moreover, that this was a conceptualization that, similar to that of Washington’s eventually had and exceptionally advantageous outcome. In 1861, for instance, when Jordan tuned over the scope of his espionage operations over to his most trusted operative, Rose O'Neal Greenhow; the latter’s significance in some of Washington’s more flighty circles enabled her to secure intelligence of great value to the Confederacy.

Furthermore, it was towards the end of this very century that the US began to focus exclusively upon the improvement of their counterespionage skills. Their success in this field, moreover, was strongly reflected within the Spanish-American War of 1898, when the US infiltrated a Spanish spy network in Montreal. Another example of America’s evolution in counterespionage, moreover, came forth later on when, in World War I, Franz von Papen, future chancellor of Weimar Germany, organized a spy and sabotage ring in the US. This ring, however, was effectually apprehended and eliminated by the Secret Service and the FBI, then a fledgling. And in the 1930s, when the FBI had attained exceptionally more significance of stature and relevance, the Bureau was effective in conclusively tackling Nazi agents in the United States as well as South America. The 1940s represented an especially significant period for US espionage and counterespionage. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, for instance, surprised the defending forces to the point of offering minimal resistance, a circumstance that suggested a need for improved U.S. facilities for the collection and analysis of intelligence (Miller, 1997).

Mid 1900: up to present day: CIA & the present day stance on US counterespionage

It was in the 1940s that the US began to display its most prolific streak in regard to espionage; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, surprised the defending forces to the point of offering minimal resistance. This was a circumstance that suggested a need for improved U.S. facilities for the collection and analysis of intelligence. The Office of Strategic Services, as a result of the increasingly apparent need for effective espionage/counterespionage skills, attempted to meet these needs and subsequently came to establishing for itself a covert operational role. By 1945, the traditional American distrust of espionage had resurfaced with a vengeance, and consequently, and the world's first superpower was temporarily shorn of a large-scale intelligence capability. But the most significant factor surfaced on July 26, 1947, when, as a result of ‘Section 102 of the National Security Act’, (Jeffreys-Jones, 2003) the CIA, the world's first democratically sanctioned secret service was formed. This heralded the most significant trial of diversification for counterintelligence within the US, as Presidents came to increasingly rely on the CIA’s effectual covert operational capabilities to produce quick solutions to political demises that showed signs of going uncharacteristically messy. Some of the more notorious examples of these ‘solutions’ moreover, were the overthrow of the democratically elected, if leftward leaning, governments of Guatemala and Chile in 1954 and 1973, respectively (Jeffreys-Jones, 2003). After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs venture however, which was an attempt to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba, the CIA inevitably came to be increasingly vulnerable to public criticism (Miller, 1997). It would furthermore be relevant to contemplate that from this period onwards, the public opinion of the collective espionage/counterespionage began to go rather sour, and rather understandably too. The relevance of this is something that is made quite clear when considering it in light of the details underlying such dramatically contentious issues as the Iran-Contra affair, as well as the far more recent, 9/11 commission report. The former, an issue that emerged in the 1980s, alleged the intelligence agencies to be indirectly involved in an illegal scheme to sell weapons to Iran. The theme of the scheme was to divert the profits into the pockets of the Contra resistance movement in Nicaragua. The evident lack of ethicalities and/moralities reasserted to the public the fundamentally contentious and risky nature of the counterespionage business. This sentiment, moreover, was ingrained even more deeply into the public following the publicizing of the 9/11 reports pertaining to the commission’s investigation. This is since the reports, which were part and parcel of the commission’s investigation, brought forth startling insinuations decreeing that US intelligence agencies had a good idea of the date and nature of the attacks as a result of their significant espionage/counterespionage activities and rings. ‘The commission showed that the Bush administration, in the months prior to Sept. 11, had much more warning of an impending terrorist attack than previously known’ (Eland. 2004).