Today, Africa is portrayed as a continent in crisis. In fact, during the last several years, most African countries have struggled from one crisis to another. Since the early 1960s, when the African colonies began to gain independence, most governments have either been unable or unwilling to serve their functions well. Most state activities in Africa have involved primarily the management of crises in order to help the incumbent (1) maintain a monopoly on power; (2) continue to control the allocation of resources; (3) plunder the economy for the benefit of the ruling coalition and its supporters; and (4) appease competitive ethnic and social cleavages, in order to maintain a semblance of political stability and continue to attract foreign resources. The state's preoccupation with crises management has prevented it from serving as an engine of social, political, and economic transformation.

Poverty

In their efforts to monopolize power at all costs, many of the post-independence governments have actually exacerbated poverty and deprivation in their countries. In South Africa , for example, the Afrikaner obsession with maintaining the system of apartheid contributed significantly to the marginalization of the black majority and the destruction of the country's development potential through perverse economic programs. Instead of serving as an engine of development, the state was turned into an instrument of plunder, to provide artificially sustained privileges for whites while severely impoverishing the indigenous peoples (see Mbaku 1993; Hazlett 1988). In other African countries, the post-independence state was used in a similar manner, serving not as a facilitator of social and economic transformation, but as an agent for the maximization of the objectives of a few individuals and groups. In several countries (e.g., Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire ), the state became an instrument for the promotion of the corporate interests of military elites. During the last forty years, the African state has either become virtually irrelevant, failing to provide the wherewithal for economic growth and development, or has degenerated into an instrument of exploitation for the benefit of a few individuals and groups. In fact, in many countries in the continent, the state has not only failed to protect citizens and their property from intrusion but has been the main source of violence directed at the people (see Mbaku 1997; Ihonvbere 1994).

During the struggle for independence, indigenous elites argued that the colonial state (and its structures) was responsible for the marginalization of the African peoples. It was generally believed that after independence and the subsequent capture of governance structures by indigenous elites, the state which had been used to oppress and exploit the African peoples, would be used to transform society socially, politically, and economically, and improve the living conditions of the historically marginalized groups and communities. Basically, the post-independence state was expected to promote rapid economic growth and help generate the wealth needed to confront poverty and deprivation. Before this could happen, however, the state inherited from the colonialists was supposed to be transformed through proper constitution making and new laws and institutions established to minimize opportunism, promote peaceful coexistence, and advance sustainable development. Unfortunately, such state reconstruction was rarely undertaken, leaving many countries in the continent with governance structures that were incapable of performing their expected functions. In addition, the indigenous elites who had captured the evacuated structures of colonial hegemony turned them into instruments of plunder and squandered the opportunity to advance the African socially, economically, and politically. Thus, post-independence political economy in the continent came to be characterized by high levels of opportunism, including corruption and rent seeking; poverty and deprivation; destructive ethnic conflict; racial intolerance; and high levels of external debts (Mbaku, 1995, 1996).

Many researchers have examined the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa . Among variables identified as obstacles to development in the continent are bureaucratic and political corruption, political violence, racial intolerance and destructive ethnic conflict, excessive population growth, non-viable economic infrastructures, poor natural resource bases, lack of both human and physical capital, protectionist trade policies, and several external constraints, including the economic policies of the developed countries (Ergas 1986; Mbaku 1989; World Bank 1981; Ayittey 1992, 1997). In recent years, however, it has become evident that institutions have an important impact on entrepreneurial activities and thus on the creation of wealth. In each society, the incentive system determines how market participants behave and consequently their ability and willingness to take part in wealth-creating activities. A country's laws and institutions determine the incentive system which citizens face. Consequently, one can argue that the several constraints to development in Africa named above are actually evidence of poorly designed, weak and inefficient institutional arrangements. Basically, the laws and institutions adopted by the African countries at independence encouraged opportunism and prevented the rapid economic growth that could have generated the wealth needed by the African countries to confront poverty and deprivation in their societies. In providing a few individuals and groups the structures to enrich themselves at the expense of the general population, the post-independence state also significantly increased inequality in the distribution of income and wealth, further exacerbating the conflict between ethnic and other social cleavages. There is now significant evidence to link economic progress to secure property rights, effective enforcement of contracts, and constitutional guarantee of economic freedoms (see Shughart 1990; Gwartney, Lawson and Black 1996).

Despite repeated warnings that AIDS could be a disaster for development, little systematic investigation has been done into the contribution of AIDS to development, and virtually no studies have been undertaken on HIV/AIDS, food security, famine, and nutrition. ( Barnett, 2002)

Demographic findings show that the secondary effect of a famine or epidemic could be at least as great as the primary effects. For example, a chain reaction of further famines and epidemics or massive out-migration might arise. ( Dyson, 2002) The food crisis developing in southern Africa could be the first major manifestation of this chain reaction.

Droughts and famines have afflicted large parts of Africa throughout history. In past decades, these food crises have had a characteristic demographic and socioeconomic profile. They have raised crude death rates by two to five fold, with mortality concentrated in very young and elderly people, ( Watkins & Menken, 1985) and mortality in males has been higher than in females. ( Macintyre, 2002) However, farmers and pastoralists have developed sophisticated coping strategies ( de Waal, 1989) that are characterized by considerable resilience--defined as the ability to return to a former livelihood on the basis of diversity of income and food sources--and accumulated skills, including knowledge of wild foods and kinship networks. ( Davies, 1995) Only when these coping strategies collapse are African societies faced with so-called entitlement failure (inability to command sufficient food to prevent starvation) and outright starvation. ( Sen, 1981) Most typically, such extreme crises have arisen in wartime, when armed forces have actively prevented civilian populations from pursuing coping strategies. ( de Waal, 1990)

The present southern African food crisis confounds many expectations. A cycle of drought is taking place, in which region wide rainfall failures can be expected about once every decade. The last such drought happened in 1991-92. Despite the fact that the region was economically and politically less well prepared to withstand a food crisis than nowadays, famine was averted. The main reason for this was the effective coping mechanisms of the affected people. ( Eldridge, 2002) The region is in better shape 10 years on: apartheid has been ended in South Africa , and there is peace in Mozambique and Angola . The exceptions are political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe and mismanaged economic liberalization in Malawi , in particular the attempt to make the national strategic grain reserve commercially viable by selling off stocks. ( Devereux, 2002)

The present food crisis is more widespread and intractable than its predecessors, and has three distinct features. First, vulnerability is very widely spread, including areas that are not severely affected by drought. The numbers defined as in need by the United Nations are considerably higher than were anticipated after the poor 2001-02 rains. Second, household impoverishment has arisen more rapidly than in earlier droughts. Third, present estimates are that--despite the return of good rains in early 2003--a high level of vulnerability will continue.

The factor that could account for these features is HIV/AIDS. Southern Africa is the location of the world's worst AIDS epidemic, with most countries having a prevalence of HIV in adults in excess of 20%. Zambia , Zimbabwe , and Botswana have recorded very high levels for several years, and AIDS mortality rates are climbing steadily.

HIV/AIDS has a great effect on dependency of family members. Projections of the demographic effect of the HIV epidemic in southern Africa do not predict substantial changes in the dependency ratio. ( Stanecki & Heaton, 2003) This counterintuitive outcome is because the fertility rate is expected to fall, and child mortality rates to rise, because of AIDS. However, this crude dependency ratio stability conceals three important distortions.

First, HIV/AIDS and its effects cluster at the level of households and (to a lesser extent) communities, because of conjugal and mother-to-child transmission. A stable dependency ratio can conceal serious adverse shifts for the affected households, which may lose viability.

Second, AIDS changes the age and sex distribution within the adult population; for example, fewer mature adults and more teenagers and people in their early twenties are present in the population. Because women are typically infected with HIV at an age several years younger than men, fewer adult women are present in the population. Those who make the greatest contribution to support of dependants--namely mature adults, especially women--form the smallest proportion of the population, whereas young men and teenagers, who have little role in support of dependants, are more plentiful.

Third, conventional dependency ratio calculations are based on the assumption that all adults are productive. In a generalized AIDS epidemic, a small, but important, number of people are chronically sick, and therefore properly belong in the dependants category.

One of the main factors impoverishing rural Africa is the burden of providing for orphans and sick adults: it is a major expenditure and diversion of labor. Most affected households struggle to cope. ( Rugalema, 2000) Some businesses have responded to the costs of AIDS by reducing sickness and disability benefits and shifting to use of self-employed subcontractors. ( Rosen & Simon, 2002) The unstated assumption is that wider society--mainly women in rural areas--will carry the burden. Furthermore, urban children orphaned by AIDS are usually sent to rural relatives to be cared for. The burden is thus doubled. In the past, rural households could rely on urban relatives for assistance during times of hardship. Nowadays, the flows of assistance have been reversed. The implication is that the preferred and most resilient livelihood coping strategy--of reliance on kinship networks for assistance--is increasingly inoperable.

Malnutrition and HIV

In past famines, adults have reduced their consumption of food and simply gone hungry. People from rural areas time and again showed remarkable physical capacity for work despite very low consumption of food. Relief agencies assumed that famine-affected adults could still look after themselves, and concerned themselves overwhelmingly with young children and their mothers. Findings of the southern African development community survey ( Southern Africa development community, 2003) showed that skipping meals was not only typical in all rural areas but was also more usual in households with a chronically ill adult. For example, 57% of such households had gone entire days without eating in the preceding 2 months. ( Southern Africa development community, 2003)

In so-called new-variant famine, adults cannot be neglected: malnutrition has very different implications. Undernourished individuals are more susceptible to being infected with HIV than are those who are well nourished. Nutritional status is also an important determinant of risks in mother-to-child transmission of HIV. ( Coutsoudis, 1999)

Adults living with HIV endanger their health by going hungry. Many types of nutritional deficiencies suppress the immune system, and hence make infections more virulent. This is true of HIV, which replicates most rapidly in malnourished individuals, hastening progression from HIV to AIDS. ( Semba, 1999) HIV-positive status inhibits absorption of nutrients, and the body's needs in fighting the infection are considerable. Hence, people living with HIV have higher nutritional needs than normal: protein requirements are usually estimated at 30-50% more, and energy needs about 15% more. Malnutrition thus threatens to accelerate progression from HIV to AIDS for millions of infected individuals.

Conversely, good nutrition delays progression from HIV to AIDS, and is essential for effective antiretroviral treatment--some medication needs to be taken on a full stomach. This fact implies that plans for introduction of antiretroviral treatment on a large scale should be combined with nutritional support programs.